Still no rhyme or region to leaving the EU? by Sykes, Olivier
The reports at the start of February 2019, of Theresa
May trying to woo certain Labour MPs1 with
promises of additional funding for the areas they
represent in return for their support of her ‘EU
withdrawal agreement’, raised a few eyebrows
among citizens and local representatives across
England’s less advantaged areas. There were a
number of reasons for this.
First, it came at the end of a week in which new
research from the Centre for Cities2 emphasised
what local authorities and communities across the
nation already knew from daily experience – that 
the burdens of austerity, far from being distributed
according to George Osborne’s dictum of ‘we’re 
all in this together’,3 have been strongly socially
regressive, hitting some of the less advantaged
places and people hardest. The largest real-term
falls in total local government spending in the
2009/10-2017/18 period disproportionately hit towns
and cities in the North of England, which have on
average seen a 20% reduction in their budgets. In
contrast, towns and cities in the South West, the
East of England and the South East (excluding
London) have seen cuts of only 9% on average.
Reflecting this tendency, Liverpool has seen a
real-term decline in day-to-day council spending of
32% since 2009/2010 – the second-largest percentage
fall after Barnsley. In Liverpool this equates to a loss
of £441 million a year since 2009/10, equivalent to
£816 less for every person in the city – the biggest
cut per resident nationally. This level of cuts means
that once local authorities have allocated support to
vital services such as social care, there is little left
for spending on other things such as planning and
development.
Our more disadvantaged places are thus hit by a
double whammy – the immediate difficulties of
keeping crucial services going and keeping on top of
important tasks such as fixing the holes in the road,
and a constrained capacity to act in the interests of
the medium- and long-term development of their
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areas. It is all a long way from the rhetoric of local
empowerment and autonomy which characterised
the 2010-15 coalition government. What price the
bespoke devolution deals concluded with some
combined authority areas if the core constitutive
local authorities are losing these kinds of levels of
support?
Secondly, this is all set against a backdrop in which
the UK government’s policy of taking the UK out of
the EU is predicted, including by its own studies,4
to hit many less advantaged regions hardest. With
growth over the next 15 years under any Brexit
scenario expected to be less than if the UK remains
fully within the EU, many such areas – including
those which voted ‘leave’ in 20165 – will potentially
be the most negatively affected economically. Any
inducements offered to their MPs in return for
supporting Mrs May’s deal need to be set alongside
such considerations. Are the sums promised going
to compensate for the losses of the austerity
decade, the impacts of any Brexit, and (see below)
potentially foregone EU funding support?
Thirdly, the EU’s regional policy has previously
provided an important source of support to less
favoured regions6 – including through initiatives for
areas such as the former coalfields – which will not
be available in future if the UK leaves. In the 1980s
the talk in some UK government circles of ‘managed
decline’7 for certain major urban areas such as
Liverpool remained unacceptable to a number 
of key actors both in the UK and at the highest
levels within European institutions. Significantly,
Conservatives like Michael Heseltine, who advocated
more attention and resources for regeneration, were
also among the most pro-European members of a
party whose decades-long ‘civil war’ over Europe
ultimately led the UK to the juncture it faces today.
EU funding programmes stepped in to support
communities affected by the decline of certain
industrial sectors. For example, initiatives such as
RECHAR provided EU support to communities
affected by pit closures – although even then
difficulties in securing UK funding to ‘match’ this
were reported and debated in Parliament.8 Yes, the
forms to access EU support were long to fill in, and
the audit trails could be mind boggling, but the
money was there – committed multi-annually to
places on the basis of need and programme
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priorities, not ad hoc clientelist accommodations
reached in backrooms.
Fourthly, although there has so far been little
indication of how much support a proposed ‘UK
Shared Prosperity Fund ‘ (UKSPF) may deliver in 
lieu of current EU Structural and Investment Funds
(ESIFs), a clearer picture is beginning to emerge of
the potential funding that UK regions could receive
from the EU Cohesion Policy post-2021 (see Figs 1
and 2).9 Work by the Conference of Peripheral
Maritime Regions (CPMR)10 suggests that if the UK
remains in the EU it could be in line to receive around
13 billion euros of regional development funding
between 2021 and 2027. This would be equivalent to a
22% increase compared with the current 2014-20
funding period – a result of the sobering fact that,
once again, many areas of the UK are falling behind
the EU average in terms of regional prosperity.
Furthermore, internal regional disparities between
regions within the UK have also increased in recent
years. This means that areas such as Cornwall and
the Isles of Scilly, West Wales and the Valleys, South
Yorkshire, Tees Valley and Durham, and Lincolnshire
could receive EU regional funding of over 500 euros
per person per year after 2021. And again reflecting
one of the often cited advantages of EU regional
funding, this would be committed over a multi-
annual period from 2021 to 2027. Any expedient
‘deals’ with certain places in return for short-term
political support would seem to be a poor substitute
for this kind of longer-term and strategic needs-
based regional policy.
Confidence in any arrangements that may replace
EU support to regions may also be tempered by the
UK government track record on austerity discussed
above and by knowledge of how in the 2014-20
round of funding the then government chose to
allocate ESIF funding to some regions. Merseyside,
for example, was allocated 202 million euros
(£167.835 million) of funding, when the European
Commission’s formula suggested the area should
receive around 350 million euros (£290.147 million) –
an approach described by Liverpool Mayor Joe
Anderson as ‘Robin Hood in reverse – taking from
the poor to give to the rich’.11
Looking ahead, the report of an initial inquiry by
the recently formed All-Party Parliamentary Group
on Post-Brexit Funding for Nations, Regions and
Local Areas12 has noted – based on the responses
of ‘just about all the contributors to the Inquiry’ –
tthat the annual budget for the UKSPF would need
to be around £1.5 billion adjusted for inflation to
match in real terms the present levels of ERDF and
ESF funding. There was less clear consensus,
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Fig. 1  EU Cohesion Policy eligibility for 2014-20 (category of regions) (left) and (right) CPMR
forecast of Cohesion Policy eligibility for 2021-27
Source: UK Entitled to 13 bn Euro Regional Funding if it Remains in EU 9
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though, around the question ‘How should the UK
Shared Prosperity Fund be divided up between the
four nations of the UK?’. The APPG thus noted that:
‘There is ... some support – in England it has to be
said – for taking a fresh look at the data and
allocating accordingly between the four nations.
This view is not shared by contributors to the
Inquiry from Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland’. ‘From these parts of the UK the strongly
held view is that not just the share of the new
Fund but also the absolute amounts (adjusted for
inflation) should be no less than the present EU
funding. The sensitivity on this point appears
considerable.’ (Emphasis added)
But regardless of such debates, ultimately, as the
CPMR notes, ‘for the moment, there is little detail
on the mechanism, governance and value’9 of the
proposed new UKSPF.
Conclusion
The full nature of the UK’s future relationship with
the European Union is unknown. Much will depend
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on the outcome of negotiations still to come. The
opportunity costs of diverting resources and
attention from genuine national policy challenges
such as the crises in housing and the health
services and from reflection on important areas of
government policy, ranging from higher education to
the environment, will continue to be high and will
impact disproportionality on those places and
communities that can least afford to bear them. 
The focus on issues such as ending freedom of
movement contrasts with the lack of information 
on future investment to aid the ‘left behind’ places
and communities that Theresa May claimed were at
the heart of her concerns in the months following
the 2016 referendum result, and which she has
apparently now rediscovered as she seeks political
support for her withdrawal agreement.
Meanwhile, the effects of ploughing on with
leaving the EU on people, places, services and
business are reported daily – from the haemorrhaging
of non-UK EU staff in the NHS to labour supply
issues in certain sectors. These are impacts that
affect real places and real communities. Added to
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Fig. 2  CPMR projection of theoretical
regional allocations (per capita)
under the proposed EU Cohesion
Policy for 2021-27
Source: UK Entitled to 13 bn Euro Regional
Funding if it Remains in EU 9
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this, many areas that have not only been the key 
UK beneficiaries of EU regional funding, but have
economies that are more integrated with the rest 
of the EU than those of London and the South East
are predicted by government and independent
analysts to be the big losers under all ‘Brexit’
scenarios.
The question of whether the decades-long EU
support for Britain’s development areas and regions
would be matched following any Brexit is still largely
open. So, as with so much else, Brexit has above all
delivered enduring uncertainty about the future
prospects for place-based policies.
Clearly if the UK does leave the EU, whether
under the terms of Theresa May’s withdrawal
agreement or under a ‘no deal’ scenario, any form
of regional policy will need to be replaced by the
domestic arrangements currently being discussed.
UK territories will also be at the mercy of domestic
trade-offs and politically expedient ‘sweetheart
deals’ with particular places and sectors.13
The domestic political dimension is very significant
here, too, because, despite the dominant media
representations, and as Danny Dorling reminds us,
the geography of Brexit is in truth more one of a
privileged ‘comfortable Britain’ than of a disadvantaged
‘left behind Britain’.14 The future of regional policy in
any post-EU UK will therefore effectively hang on the
extent to which, domestically, there is an appetite
for redistribution – or, put crudely, how far the
former geography will be willing to support the
latter in a UK floating free from EU (and historically
British) principles of territorial cohesion and inter-
regional solidarity. Such issues are rendered even
more complex by devolution- and autonomy-seeking
tendencies currently building within the UK.
In the four decades of UK membership of the
EEC/EU, the EU Cohesion Policy was one
mechanism through which the resources of
prosperous parts of the UK found their way to less
prosperous UK areas. In light of this, and of
forecasts of the regional impacts of leaving the EU,
industrial disinvestment,13 polls indicating a shift in
areas such as the North East of England and Wales
towards support for remaining in the EU,15 and the
continuing opportunities that post-2021 Cohesion
Policy could offer to the UK’s less advantaged areas,
the MPs who are being courted by Theresa May
might well still best serve their constituents and
areas by making the case for the UK remaining a full
member of the EU.
● Olivier Sykes is with the Department of Geography and
Planning at the University of Liverpool. The views expressed
are personal.
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